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There is a saying – now a military cliché –attributed to several senior army and navy 
commanders of the mid-20th century, that amateurs or juniors discuss tactics, while their 
seniors and other professionals discuss logistics; a saying that has been qualified in recent 
decades by the view that the most senior and professional decisions of all are concerned with 
force generation, the creation of the formations needed for a possible future war.
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 Logistics, 
together with force generation, was very obviously of critical importance to the British 
recovery of the Falkland Islands in April-June 1982. Port Stanley, the Falklands’ capital and 
only town, is considerably further from London than Tokyo is. The British won chiefly 
because of their ability, in an improvised military campaign for which they had no prior 
planning, to project and sustain a Task Force consisting of a Carrier Task Group and an 
Amphibious Task Group across a distance of over 12,000 kilometres. A vital role was played 
by the small British territory of Ascension Island, in the South Atlantic, just over half way to 
the Falklands. A lesser but still important role was played by the British recovery early in the 
campaign of the island of South Georgia, which in 1982 was part of the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies, and is about 1,500 kilometres east of East Falkland. However, the lack of a 
secure harbour or port facility of any size on either Ascension Island or South Georgia 
imposed a severe time limit on how long the British warships could remain in the South 
Atlantic before they would need to leave the area for essential maintenance.
2
 
The most basic logistic requirements for the Falklands War, as for most wars of this 
period, were ammunition, fuel, food, medical support, maintenance and transport. From a 
logistical viewpoint, the British success depended on their ability to transport to the Falkland 
Islands sufficient numbers of bombs, shells, explosives and other ammunition to overcome 
the Argentinean defences, together with the personnel to deliver them. The single most 
difficult logistical issue identified by the British after the war was the supply of fuel for all 
purposes (usually abbreviated to POL for ‘petrol, oil and lubricants’), from ship and aircraft 
engines, to the generators ashore for antiaircraft missile batteries and the medical field 
dressing station.
3
 British warships at their normal state of readiness were largely self-
sufficient in everything but fuel. The 26 ships (later rising to 44) of the Royal Navy that took 
an active part in the campaign were supported by 22 ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
(RFA), including six specialist Landing Ships Logistic (LSLs), by two ships of the Royal 
Maritime Auxiliary Service (RMAS), and by 45 requisitioned civilian ‘ships taken up from 
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trade’, known as STUFT vessels. Of these, 10 Royal Fleet Auxiliary and 15 STUFT ships 
were fuel tankers, or 25 fuel tankers out of 113 ships in total.
4
  
The Ministry of Defence’s report to Parliament in December 1982 on the lessons of 
the war identified four main logistics lessons, all of them very much in keeping with other 
wars of the period.
5
 The first of these lessons was that the level of expenditure of 
ammunition, particularly missiles, was much higher than had been predicted. The senior 
British land force logistician in the campaign afterwards calculated that in the land battle, 
ammunition expenditure was four times the planned rate on average; and five times the 
planned rate for 105mm high explosive shells and 81mm mortar rounds.
6
 The second and 
consequent lesson was a need to improve logistical support for British operations outside the 
NATO area. The third lesson was the importance of air-to-air refuelling. The Operation Black 
Buck air raids by single RAF Vulcan bombers on Port Stanley airfield, mounted from 
Ascension Island, were each dependent on the extremely long-range in-flight refuelling 
support provided by a relay of 11 RAF Victor tanker aircraft, plus two more on the return 
flight. The British also established an air-bridge of long-range aircraft staging through 
Ascension Island, including the air-dropping of small essential components, and sometimes 
of personnel, to ships of the Task Force within 48 hours of any request. A final lesson was the 
importance of the use of civilian resources, in addition to military personnel and equipment, 
for the logistics of the campaign. Many of the civilian STUFT ships used had to be fitted with 
extra equipment, including helicopter landing decks, specialist communications apparatus, 
and water treatment plants for the long voyage. In addition, the North Sea oilrig offshore 
support vessel MV Stena Seaspread was converted to act as a forward repair ship, and the 
cruise liner SS Uganda to act as a hospital ship.  
The British understood the established practices of good logistics, but were forced 
repeatedly to violate them during the campaign for equally good reasons of international 
politics. Between the Argentinean seizure of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia on 2 
April and the first British combat actions, starting on 21-26 April with the recovery of South 
Georgia, it was essential to their strategy to maintain a highly visible sense of continuity, 
through diplomatic, economic and military pressure, to avoid a situation in which the 
Argentinean action might obtain international acceptance. The rapid dispatch from southern 
British ports of part of the Task Force, starting on 5-8 April, was only possible through the 
use of military reservists and civilian land transport, who in the first week moved to the 
embarkation ports approximately 39,000 tonnes of freight by road, using about 100 chartered 
large flatbed trucks, followed in the second week by 44 specially hired British Rail trains.
7
 
Thereafter, it was an essential part of British strategy that there should not be a visible halt to 
their actions, and that continuity of action must be preserved. When one of their two aircraft 
carriers with the Task Force, HMS Invincible, developed engine trouble shortly after 
departure, a 5-tonne propeller bearing was airlifted out to join the ship in considerable 
secrecy, rather than have the Invincible return to port.  
In the rush to sail, the ships of the Task Force were not ‘tactically loaded’ or ‘combat 
loaded’ (to use the technical military terms) with troops and stores in the order in which these 
would be deployed and needed in battle.  The first brigade despatched, 3rd Commando 
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Brigade, was structured and intended to be tactically and logistically self-sufficient, sailing 
with a logistical reserve of 30 days of combat supplies and 60 days of other supplies totalling 
about 9,000 tonnes, with one battalion’s reserves held on the dedicated stores support ship 
RFA Stromness and the rest distributed on several ships.
8
 Most ships of the Task Force also 
used a short halt at Ascension Island to redistribute personnel, stores and equipment before 
continuing to the Falklands. But there were many reported cases of staff or equipment being 
assigned to more than one ship, either at the start of the voyage or at Ascension, and then 
either losing contact with their parent unit or being unable to secure other transport. Several 
units were without important personnel or equipment until late in the campaign, or even until 
its end.  
There were further logistical consequences to the British need for a fast resolution to 
the campaign. Much of 3rd Commando Brigade’s ammunition, about 2,000 tonnes of high 
explosives, was loaded onto a single P&O cross-Channel ferry, the MV Elk, which was a 
point of vulnerability for much of the campaign. 3rd Commando Brigade, which ordinarily 
had three light infantry Commando battalions and a light artillery battalion, was reinforced 
for the campaign with two further light infantry battalions from the Parachute Regiment, and 
some medium armoured fighting vehicles. Its eventual total strength was between six and 
eight major units and 16 subunits, or about 5,500 troops, adding to its logistical burden. A 
further point of vulnerability was the use of the cargo ship SS Atlantic Conveyor as an aircraft 
transporter. The loss of this ship with most of the British heavy lift helicopter fleet onboard 
on 25 May, four days after the start of the land campaign, forced major changes in British 
operations. Political as well as military considerations limited the use of two large ocean 
liners as troop transporters, SS Canberra for 3rd Commando Brigade and later the more 
famous RMS Queen Elizabeth 2 for 5th Infantry Brigade, neither of which could be risked as 
a target for any length of time. 
A logistical pause of perhaps only one or two weeks more in the Task Force’s 
advance southwards would have allowed the British to strengthen their air defences with 
more Harrier combat aircraft, to fit their major warships with the Vulcan Phalanx anti-missile 
system as a defence against the Argentinean use of Exocet sea-skimming missiles, and to 
equip their helicopter pilots with night vision goggles. These and other significant additions 
to British tactical capabilities were only starting to arrive as their land campaign drew to its 
successful conclusion on 14 June. This is best illustrated by the contrast between the two 
battles fought by 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment during the Falklands War, first the 
almost unsupported light infantry attack at Goose Green on 28 May, then the all-arms battle 
with armour, artillery and air support at Wireless Ridge on 13 June.
9
  
There were two international political agreements at the highest level without which 
the British campaign would have been logistically impossible. The first of these agreements 
was the lack of objection from other NATO countries to the British drawing on their own 
reserves of equipment and munitions stocks that were designated for use within the NATO 
area. Many countries also provided the British with logistical support of an informal nature. 
This included providing specialist military equipment, and denying Argentina replacements, 
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components or technical support for some of its weapons systems. A very important case, 
which is still politically sensitive, was the Argentinean difficulty in obtaining replacements 
and maintenance support for its French-built Aérospaciale Exocet missiles.
10
  
The other major political agreement that was crucial for British logistics was the 
United States’ decision at the start of the campaign not to obstruct British access to its 
facilities at Wideawake US Air Force Auxiliary airbase on Ascension Island, and to provide 
considerable informal co-operation, even before the United States’ public announcement of 
support for the British on 30 April, following the failure of its mediation attempts. The exact 
use that the British could make of Wideawake airbase could have been severely limited by 
the United States’ government. The airfield had originally been built by the Americans during 
the Second World War, and under an agreement of 1956 (amended in 1962) the British could 
use the 10,000 foot runway at 24 hours’ notice for just one military aircraft, and 72 hours’ 
notice for more than one aircraft. But this agreement had not been renewed since 1962, and 
might have been considered by either side to have lapsed. In fact, the United States’ level of 
co-operation went far beyond allowing the British use of the runway at Wideawake, including 
by granting them almost complete access to the airfield’s 1,200,000 US gallons of aviation 
fuel stocks, and later by agreeing to the British storing their own fuel stocks in the facilities at 
Wideawake.
11
     
On 2 April 1982, the United States’ military staff of Wideawake airbase consisted of 
just one man, the base commander, who was a lieutenant colonel. Various British, American, 
and other civilian organisations were also represented on Ascension Island, including the 
BBC, Cable & Wireless, Pan American Airways, and NASA. The civilian population was 
about 1,000 including 200 children, chiefly from the nearby British island of St. Helena. 
Normally, aircraft movements on Wideawake’s only runway averaged fewer than 20 flights a 
month. There was no British military presence, and the British logistic effort at Ascension 
was entirely improvised, building up from nothing to 1,400 personnel during the campaign 
without a formal organisational structure ever being established. Even housing and feeding 
such an increase of people was a significant problem. For the duration of the campaign, the 
average number of aircraft movements at Wideawake rose to just under 100 flights a day, 
with rotor movements outnumbering fixed wing by 5 to 1. It has been claimed that on one 
day, 16 April, Wideawake logged over 300 aircraft movements, making it the busiest airfield 
in the world. Aircraft from civil air carriers transported more than 350 tonnes of freight to 
Ascension Island, including helicopters being air-transported.
12
  
The second most difficult logistical issue for the British was transport for the land 
campaign, once the decision was confirmed on 17 April to land at San Carlos Bay, just over 
80 kilometres from Port Stanley. On sailing from Britain, 3rd Commando Brigade had chosen 
to take its 76 Volvo BV202 tracked oversnow vehicles, but no wheeled vehicles other than 
nine Eager Beaver rough-terrain fork-lifts and ten 4-tonner trucks with fuel pods, in the belief 
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that wheeled vehicles could not cope with the rugged and boggy East Falklands terrain.
13
 In 
fact light four-wheel drive vehicles and tractors used by local farmers could be used, and 
some were pressed into service. But following the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, the British 
possessed only one heavy-lift RAF Chinook helicopter for their whole ground campaign, 
augmented by several medium-sized and smaller helicopters. Sea transport along the coast 
was also limited by the numbers of landing craft, together with powered rafts known as 
Mexeflotes, and other smaller craft, and by British reluctance to risk larger vessels close 
inshore. One obvious consequence of this lack of transport was that much of the British 
advance towards Port Stanley had to be made on foot. A further consequence was that at 
Goose Green on 28 May light artillery support was very limited, and the guns eventually ran 
out of high explosive shells. For the final battles for the hills above Port Stanley, the British 
light artillery had only 500 rounds per gun, half their optimum requirement, although 
repeated statements that more than one battery was critically short of shells at the battles’ end 
have been contested by some participants.
14
  
One logistical advantage for the British was that 3rd Commando Brigade had its own 
dedicated logistics battalion, known as the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines 
(RM). This consisted of a headquarters, a medical squadron, a transport squadron, a 
workshop squadron and an ordnance squadron; during the campaign its strength rose from 
256 to 673 personnel. The most notable absence from this battalion in the war was the 
specialist petroleum platoon of its ordnance squadron, who since they were civilian volunteer 
reservists were not included in the deployment. Consequently, following the San Carlos 
landings, the 3rd Commando Brigade petrol point was operated by inexperienced troops, 




The logistics landing plan for 3rd Commando Brigade, approved on 10 April before a 
decision had been taken on the actual landing site or sites, was for a small base to be 
established ashore but for most of the brigade supplies to be kept afloat off the beachhead, 
including two LSLs carrying the equivalent of two days’ resupply for the brigade, and SS 
Canberra for immediate medical support. Once the decision to land at San Carlos was made, 
Ajax Bay was chosen for the logistics base ashore, as the largest of the very limited beach 
landing areas, and with the only buildings, a disused mutton refrigeration plant. As the British 
advanced across East Falkland, a forward logistics base for the brigade was created at Teal 
Inlet in Port Salvador bay, to support the final battles for Port Stanley. But following the first 
landings at San Carlos on 21 May, it was obvious that the plan to hold most supplies offshore 
and afloat was impractical in the face of Argentinean air attacks. Instead, the main supply 
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dump had to be established at Ajax Bay, despite its unsuitability, including its lack of 
sufficient space to disperse stocks safely and create a circuit. The fleet auxiliary and STUFT 
ships had to be brought in under cover of darkness to unload, mostly sailing away before each 
morning’s air attacks. Most of the STUFT ships did not have the capability to unload by 




This had two major logistical consequences for the British. First, since the Commando 
Logistic Regiment had no helicopters or landing craft under its own command, it was in 
direct and often unsuccessful competition with tactical and operational commanders. Ship 
movements in and out of the beachhead were controlled from the Task Force, and were 
highly dependent on the estimated and actual air threat, so that requests even for essential 
supplies and equipment could not necessarily be met. Secondly, almost all the British 
helicopters and landing craft were tied up in unloading at San Carlos including Ajax Bay for 
about a week, leaving none for forward movements out of the beachhead. At the political 
level, the British were increasingly sensitive to the possibility of international support for 
their actions declining, and the failure in London to understand the logistical situation in the 
Falklands led to increasing frustration, and to the orders to advance being given that led to the 
controversial Battle of Goose Green. 
In the British advance across East Falkland, food and water, and non-combat 
medicine, were only relatively minor issues. But exposure to the cold weather was a problem 
for all troops, and in the boggy and rugged terrain of the Falklands also caused cases of 
trench foot, and endemic mild diarrhoea from drinking the water. Battle casualty treatment 
and evacuation functioned well, resulting in a very high survival rate for casualties treated. Of 
over 1,000 casualties evacuated back to the designated hospital ship, the SS Uganda, 
including over 300 Argentineans, all but three men survived. But the only suitable location 
for the field dressing station at Ajax Bay, known as ‘The Red and Green Life Machine’ (from 
the red beret worn by the Parachute Regiment and the green beret worn by the Royal 
Marines), was the disused refrigeration plant, next to a large ammunition dump. In 
consequence the British decided not to mark the dressing station with a Red Cross for 
protection under the Geneva Convention since it was so close to the ammunition dump, and 
at one point it functioned with two unexploded bombs lodged in its roof.
17
  
  With the arrival of 5th Infantry Brigade on 2 June, the British opened a second axis of 
advance eastward south of the advance of 3rd Commando Brigade, with a forward logistics 
base being established at Bluff Cove and intended to support this advance. There is a 
controversy over the decision to use the three battalions of the fresh brigade as part of the 
British advance, rather than to protect the beachhead or reinforce 3rd Commando Brigade 
further. Again, a large part of this decision came from the political need to end the war as 
quickly as possible, and also from the belief that the Argentinean troops were of poor quality. 
Unlike 3rd Commando Brigade with its integral logistics battalion, 5th Infantry Brigade 
deployed with only two ordnance companies, since its intended logistics unit were reservists 
and were not sent out to the Falklands; the brigade also had almost no suitable cross-country 
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transport. For the final battles for Port Stanley, the Commando Logistic Regiment (which 
absorbed these ordnance companies) had to support the equivalent of a small division, with 
eight infantry battalions. Also, in order to move the troops and equipment of 5th Infantry 
Brigade forward, the British had to risk unprotected ships and landing craft close inshore. 
This led to the loss on 8 June of the LSL Sir Galahad, and the damage and temporary 
abandonment of the LSL Sir Tristam, from air attack at Fitzroy Creek near Bluff Cove. 
The British plan of campaign was aimed initially at interdicting Argentinean logistics 
on the Falkland Islands, starting with their Maritime Exclusion Zone on 12 April, which was 
extended to a Total Exclusion Zone on 30 April, and was intended to prevent reinforcement 
or resupply of the islands. Repeated attacks on Port Stanley airfield and smaller grass airstrips 
were intended to reduce the threat from Argentinean aircraft, but also to reduce Argentinean 
helicopter mobility. The British believed correctly that they could do little to affect 
ammunition and other supplies reaching the Argentinean troops on the hills guarding Port 
Stanley. They discovered after the Argentinean surrender that food and protective tentage had 
not reached many of these troops, but this appears to have been due to poor Argentinean 
organisation rather than to any British efforts.       
In logistics as in all other aspects of their campaign, the British depended very heavily 
on high-quality personnel improvising to overcome the difficulties that they faced. Although 
logistical factors inevitably played a critical role in the campaign, there was no occasion on 
which adverse logistical issues became insuperable. From that perspective, and certainly 
when compared to their adversaries, British logistics in the Falklands War must count as a 
considerable success. 
  
 
